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Abstract: This study aims to address the relative lack of research examining the Canadian 
experience of terrorism relating to the ‘Global Salafi Jihad’. The fundamental research 
question was ‘What have people living in, or from, Canada been doing to support or advance 
violent jihad either at home or abroad?’ Data were collected on individuals active from the 
1980s through to the end of 2011 in an effort to be as exhaustive as possible. They were 
analysed according to three broad categories: Background variables; Operational variables; 
and Investigations and Outcomes. The sample was further divided into two and results 
compared according to whether individuals began offending before or after September 11th 
2001, in order to assess change over time. The paper begins with a brief history of terrorism 
in Canada, followed by the methodology, analysis of variables, and summary and 
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A Brief History of Canadian Terrorism 
Canada has, on the whole, been fortunate in its experience of terrorism. During the 1960s 
through to the early 1970s there were overlapping waves of terrorism primarily perpetrated 
by two distinct movements.1 The first was the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, who were part 
of a Russian religious sect that had settled in British Columbia at the beginning of the 20th 
century.2 Their beliefs brought them into conflict with organised society and they protested 
by way of public nudity, arson and bombings, peaking in the early 1960s.3 The second group 
was the far more well-known Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) thought to be responsible 
for the majority of Quebecois separatist violence, which peaked from about 1968 to 1971.4 
FLQ violence declined following the ‘October Crisis’ of 1970 when Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau implemented the War Measures Act in response to the kidnapping of British Trade 
Commissioner James Cross and Quebec’s Labour Minister Pierre Laporte (who was 
subsequently murdered).5  Following the military-led round-up of suspected militants, the 
loss of popular support combined with improved political opportunities hastened the group’s 
demise.6  
According to Ross’s calculations, from 1960-1985 the Sons of Freedom and the FLQ 
were responsible for 296 acts of terrorism on Canadian soil (although some estimates are 
much higher7), with close to 200 additional incidents attributable to a variety of other groups 
and individuals.8 Within those 25 years, just 10 people (including 2 terrorists) were killed as a 
result of terrorist violence in Canada. The Global Terrorism Database reports just 39 acts of 
terrorism in Canada for the period 1986-2010, including just 3 domestic fatalities (none of 
which are assigned to known groups).9 
Figures on domestic attacks, however, reveal little of Canada’s involvement in 
terrorism. It has been used to plan, support and even launch attacks against foreign interests, 
most notably the bombing of Air India Flight 182 by Sikh separatists, which exploded en-
route from Montreal to London on June 23rd 1985, killing 329 people.10 Canada has also been 
used extensively as a base of operations for fundraising and support activities by a wide 
variety of international terrorist organizations on an ongoing basis. “By 1998, every major 
terrorist group in the world was operating in Canada” and there were few legal measures in 
place to prevent it before December 2001.11  
 
The Evolving Islamist Terror Threat 
Islamist militants have also taken advantage of Canada since at least the 1980s. Individuals 
have been linked to a range of terrorist organizations (including Hamas and Hezbollah12), 




although the focus here is upon the ‘Global Salafi Jihad’ advanced by al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates.13 The most prominent among these early Islamist ‘entrepreneurs’ was Ahmed Said 
Khadr who first came to Canada in 1975, was awarded citizenship, and became a fundraiser 
for the Afghan mujahideen beginning in the mid-1980s.14 Among his associates were 
Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and many other senior al-Qaeda 
operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan.15 He raised thousands of dollars in Canada, 
ostensibly for charity, and in December 1995 was arrested in Pakistan on suspicion of having 
funded the Egyptian embassy bombing in Islamabad the previous month.16 Although then-
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien intervened to secure his release, intelligence continued to 
implicate Khadr and in January 2001 he was designated as an al-Qaeda financier by the UN.17 
The realisation in hindsight that Chrétien had erred created what is known as the ‘Khadr 
effect’- a reluctance among Canadian politicians to intervene on behalf of citizens held 
abroad on suspicion of terrorism, should they cause future embarrassment.18 Indeed, Khadr 
continued his activities and raised his family in the same environment (three of his sons –all 
Canadian citizens- are included in the current database alongside their father). But they 
returned to Toronto whenever required and Khadr senior was well known among Canadian-
based militants. He was ultimately killed in a shootout with Pakistani soldiers in October 
2003 near the Afghan border,19 after which a pro-jihadi website described him as a “founding 
member of al-Qaeda”.20 
Another well-known early example is Fateh Kamel who came to Canada from Algeria 
in the late 1980s and married a Canadian.21 Over the next decade he spent time in 
Afghanistan and Bosnia, travelled extensively in support of the mujahideen (working closely 
with Sheikh Anwar al-Shabaan of the Islamic Cultural Institute of Milan) and established a 
network of jihadi supporters in Montreal.22 Members of the network engaged in organised 
theft and dealt in false passports and other fraudulent papers which were used to support the 
activities of militants in Europe and elsewhere.23 Kamel was eventually arrested in Jordan in 
March/April 1999 and extradited to France where he was convicted for being part of a 
criminal-terrorist conspiracy and providing false documents to terrorists behind the 1995 
metro bombings and the Roubaix gang armed robberies of 1996.24  
More significant still was the arrest of Ahmed Ressam on December 14th 1999 as he 
was entering the United States with explosives in the trunk of his car, intending to bomb Los 
Angeles airport. After starting out as a thief in the Kamel network Ressam had gone on to 
train at militant camps in Afghanistan and had been acting on behalf of the al-Qaeda 
leadership.25 His arrest was a watershed moment for Canadian counter-terrorism, stoking 




fears in the US that its northern neighbour was lax on security and therefore a potential 
threat.26 It simultaneously served as a wake-up call for Canadian authorities who had been 
monitoring Islamist militant networks but –as was the case in most Western countries- had 
failed to grasp the seriousness of the threat. The result was a lasting and acutely felt need to 
avoid making the same mistake again, and, after 9/11, to demonstrate to the US that Canada 
was a reliable partner in the ‘War on Terror’27 (termed the ‘Ressam effect’28).  
In the ensuing years the Islamist terror networks that had been allowed to develop 
during the 1990s were dismantled by way of arrests, deportations and the use of security 
certificates to detain suspected terrorists without charge, often on the basis of secret 
evidence29 (similar to control orders in the United Kingdom). The Canadian government 
strengthened its capacity to combat terrorism by way of enhanced legislation (beginning with 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, passed on December 18, 200130) combined with structural reforms31 
and budgetary increases for national security, which by 2011 exceeded CAN $92 billion.32 
Canadian commandos took part in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and combat troops 
officially supported the war-effort beginning in February 2002 (ending in July 2011).33 
Predictably, this led to Canada being named as a target for attacks by Osama bin Laden in a 
speech broadcast in November 200234, thus redefining Canada’s status among global jihadis. 
And although Canada did not directly participate in the war in Iraq,35 this did not earn it 
exemption from the ire of Islamist militants- in March 2004 Canadians were rated the fifth 
most desirable Western target in an article posted online by jihadists.36  
Despite these words Canadians were not singled out for attack in the same way that 
some of their allies were, but rather continued to be ‘caught in the cross-fire’ in attacks aimed 
at others or at the West in general, such as the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, the bombing 
of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, the Mumbai attacks in 2008 and the bombing of 
the Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in 2009.37 Canada was targeted most directly 
outside of a warzone by a group of British militants arrested in August 2006, who had been 
planning to bomb several airplanes using liquid explosives, but even then the Canadian 
targets were secondary to American airlines.38  
Similarly, Canadian citizens arrested or suspected of involvement in Islamist 
terrorism in the early post-9/11 years suggested a continuation, rather than a clear break from 
the past in that they continued to focus their activities overseas. Mohammed Mansour 
Jabarah, for example, (arrested in Oman in March 2002) had been planning to bomb Western 
embassies in South East Asia39; and Mohammad Momin Khawaja (arrested in Ottawa in 
March 2004) had been assisting a group of British jihadis planning to attack targets in the 




UK.40 It may have been surprising that these men had grown up in Canada, as opposed to 
immigrating as established adult militants, but they had not seemingly intended to harm their 
countrymen. 
The nature of the threat was, however, changing. A Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) briefing for the year 2004-2005 reported that “[w]hile the threat remains 
concentrated overseas, an attack on Canadian soil is now probable”.41 Little more than a year 
later the ‘Toronto 18’ arrests took place, ultimately resulting in eleven convictions –all young 
men who had spent most of their lives in Canada- including four convictions for planning 
domestic terror attacks.42 One of the group leaders, Zakaria Amara, had constructed a 
functioning detonator and two of his followers were arrested as they unloaded 3 tonnes of 
what they thought was ammonium nitrate fertilizer in a police sting operation.43 They are 
believed to have been targeting the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS headquarters and/or a 
Canadian military base for bombings intended to force the government to withdraw troops 
from Afghanistan.44  
Since then there have been three more alleged Islamist terrorism plots aimed purely at 
domestic targets (Hiva Mohammad Alizadeh, Misbahuddin Ahmed and Khurram Syed Sher, 
arrested in August 2010,45 Matin Abdul Stanikzy, arrested in November the same year; and 
John Nuttall and Amanda Karody, arrested in July 2013).46 A fourth plot, uncovered in April 
2013, allegedly involved a plan to derail a passenger train travelling from Toronto to New 
York.47 These cases, in addition to continuing reports and arrests in relation to Canadians 
involved in terrorism overseas have eroded the lingering assumption that Canada is somehow 
immune to violent radicalization at home. This realization is supported by findings from 
opinion polls of Canadian Muslims, which reveal that although the vast majority report 
positive attitudes towards Canada, a significant minority nevertheless express support for 
terrorism. For example, one report in 2006 found that 5% of those who were aware of the 
Toronto 18 case felt that the attacks would have been completely justified had they gone 
ahead, and a further 7% felt they would have been somewhat justified.48 There has also been 
concern among security analysts about the potential for ostensibly non-violent groups such as 
Hizb-ut Tahrir (which had its inaugural meeting in Canada in a Mississauga community 
centre in July 200949) to foster anti-Canadian sentiments.50 Coupled with the fact that the 
Canadian Muslim population, currently at 940,000 or 2.8% of the population, is estimated to 
triple by 2030,51 there appears to be a growing sense of uncertainty among policymakers 
about the potential for further radicalization among subsections of some communities.52    




Within this context CSIS has reported that “religious extremism” is its primary 
counter-terrorism concern on the domestic stage,53 a sentiment echoed by Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper, who in September 2011 confirmed that Islamist terrorism continued to 
present the main threat to Canadian national security.54 This was yet again reiterated with the 
unveiling of Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy in February 2012.55 Yet despite this obvious 
concern, there has been very little in the way of empirical research to examine Islamist 
terrorism in Canada,56 leaving a significant deficit in current understanding of the threat. 
Questions remain as to the demographic backgrounds of those involved; how and why they 
have radicalized; what precisely Canadians have been doing in support of violent jihad; how 
the phenomenon has developed over time; and how the Canadian experience compares to 
other Western countries? Based on an exhaustive sample of publicly known cases dating 
from the 1980s through to 2011, the present study attempts to answer these questions. 
 
Methodology 
The immediate issue in any study of terrorism is how the term is defined. It is well known 
that there is not (and likely never will be) a universal definition of terrorism, therefore the 
focus of research and the limits of validity and possible generalization are defined by the 
research question and sample. The overarching research question here was ‘What have people 
living in, or from, Canada been doing to support or advance violent jihad either at home or 
abroad?’ The sample is restricted to cases pertaining to the ‘global Salafi jihad’ referring to 
the al-Qaeda ‘brand’ of Sunni Islamist terrorism whereby jihad is believed to be necessary 
violence against the perceived enemies of Islam.57 Restricting the sample in this way 
maintains analytical focus and facilitates comparison to previous studies which have utilised 
similar criteria.58 
The inclusion -or exclusion- of individuals in this study is not a judgement of guilt or 
innocence and has no bearing whatsoever on legal proceedings. It is an objective analysis of 
publicly available information intended to improve understanding of a certain type of 
behaviour. The terms terrorist, militant and jihadi are used interchangeably to describe the 
individuals in the sample based upon their (alleged) behaviour, which included the following 
non-mutually exclusive categories: 1) Membership in a terrorist organization, where no other 
specific offences could be determined (e.g. Mohamed Harkat); 2) Promoting jihad (e.g. 
Salman An-Noor Hossain); 3) Fundraising (Ahmed Said Khadr); 4) Facilitating jihad (e.g. 
Faruq Khalil Muhammad ’Isa); 5) Domestic training (members of the Toronto 18 group); 6) 
Attempted overseas training and combat (e.g. Mohamed Hassan Hersi); 7) Successful 




overseas training with no further offences (e.g. Amr Hamed); 8) Jihadi fighter in foreign 
conflicts (e.g. Abdullahi Afrah); and 9) Planning/conducting attacks (e.g. Hiva Mohammad 
Alizadeh et al). 
Rather than distinguish between ‘home-grown’ and ‘foreign’ militants (which is by no 
means a clear-cut affair) individuals were included in the sample regardless of their 
nationality or place of birth, as long as their offending (i.e. relevant behaviour) occurred after 
they had taken up residence in Canada. There were no restrictions otherwise in terms of when 
offences occurred. This is in line with the research goal of conducting as comprehensive an 
analysis as possible. 
 Included individuals (see Appendix A) were classified according to the following 
categories, which may be treated with varying degrees of confidence in terms of reliability of 
allegations: 1) Confirmed domestic prosecutions (e.g. Said Namouh); 2) Killed in action 
(government confirmed/ news reports, e.g. Rudwan Khalil Abubaker); 3) Foreign convictions 
(e.g. Mohamed Warsame); 4) Offender confessions (e.g. Abdurahman Khadr); 5) Legal 
allegations (domestic/ foreign, e.g. Ferid Ahmed Imam and Maiwand Yar); 6) Extra-judicial 
sanctions (domestic/ international, e.g. Mahmoud Jaballah); and 7) Public allegations (e.g. 
Abderraouf Jdey).  
Individuals excluded (see Appendix B) were those classified as visitors (i.e. did not 
live in Canada for a prolonged period or whose time in Canada could not be confirmed as 
significant, e.g. Mohamedou Ould Slahi, Nizar bin Muhammad Naser Nawar); those for 
whom only previous offending before coming to Canada is alleged or confirmed (e.g. Ahmed 
al-Kaysee, Hassan Almrei); non-Sunni militants (e.g. Mohammad Ashraf Siddiqui); those for 
whom there was insufficient information (e.g. Aumar Alsorani); any cases where individuals 
were explicitly cleared, acquitted or had charges stayed (e.g. Maher Arar); and any 
individuals more appropriately included in samples for other countries that the author is 
currently working on (e.g. Tahawwur Hussain Rana- included in a sample of US-based 
militants).  
The total number of individuals considered for inclusion in the sample (prior to any 
exclusions) came to 178 individuals, which was then reduced to 64 as per the above criteria. 
These 64 individuals represent the most comprehensive sample of Canadian jihadists to date. 
However, as is often the case in terrorism research, missing information was a problem. This 
is explicitly acknowledged throughout the analysis, and is furthermore reflected in the way 
that percentages are reported. Researchers sometimes ignore missing information and express 
percentages as a function of the number of cases on which they do have data (%n), rather 




than the true total. A problem with this is that it ignores the general likelihood of certain 
outcomes and possible bias in the availability of information, thereby potentially distorting 
the picture. For example, where level of education is unknown, it is less likely that this will 
include completed university qualifications because these are a statistically less likely 
outcome anyway, and it is also less likely that this would go unreported if known (since these 
sorts of details are of interest to the press). It is therefore more accurate to present 
percentages as a function of the true total and to include information on missing data, which 
is the practice adopted herein. The reader is encouraged to bear these details in mind when 
interpreting the analysis. 
The primary sources of data were open source records consisting of news reports, 
court records, law enforcement press releases and other published accounts. Detailed 
chronological accounts of each case were constructed and data were entered into an Excel 
spread-sheet including 45 predetermined variables of interest per person, relating to 
background information, operational (behavioural) details and details of the investigation and 
outcome. Following the initial database construction, the author conducted field research in 
Canada consisting of interviews with relevant and informed individuals who were asked 
about specific cases (in relation to missing or uncertain information) and/or about recent 
developments relating to Islamist terrorism and counter-terrorism in Canada. Those 
interviewed included an undercover operative in the Toronto 18 case, now counter-terrorism 
consultant (Mubin Shaikh), two individuals from within the Canadian intelligence 
community, an academic researcher (Michael King), two journalists (Michelle Shephard and 
Isabel Teotonio), and two individuals involved in counter-radicalization efforts in the Toronto 
area (Muhammad Robert Heft of CanBridge Consulting59 and Sayyid Ahmed Amiruddin of 
the Al Sunnah Foundation60). Others were approached but declined to participate. The sample 
of interviews was small, occurring over just 10 days, and was limited by opportunity, but 
nevertheless helped achieve the stated aims.  
Once the database was complete the data were analysed according to whether 
individuals began offending before or after September 11th 2001, regardless of when they 
ceased offending. The rationale for this is that it is more relevant to understand the context 
within which individuals began offending, as opposed to when they end, since this is usually 
involuntary. And although the 2003 invasion of Iraq has previously been described as a key 
turning point in the development of Islamist terrorism in Western countries,61 the 9/11 attacks 
were chosen as an equally, if not more significant, point in time.62 This choice makes little 
difference in the overall analysis while still allowing an assessment of change and 




development. It is, however, also prudent to note that the overall sample of 64 is thus divided 
into two: the ‘pre-9/11’ sample (n = 35) and the ‘post 9/11’ sample (n = 29). Percentages are 
easily skewed when dealing with such small numbers and therefore any conclusions that we 
draw from these data are necessarily tentative. Nevertheless, developments observed in the 
Canadian data are broadly in accordance with previous findings from other Western countries 
(detailed below), thus lending mutual support to one another.  
As a final caveat, it is important to note this study was completed in early 2012. Since 
then, as of mid-2013, another ten jihadi terrorism cases (including at least 15 Canadian 
residents/citizens) have been reported.63 Although it has not been possible to update the 
quantitative analysis to include these cases, they are briefly referred to in text/footnotes where 
relevant, and the overall analysis remains largely unaffected.  
The following sections present the analysis for background variables (including a 
statistical summary, individual classifications, geographic distribution, demographic profiles, 
radicalization and ideological classifications), followed by operational variables (including 
group characteristics, offence periods, operational roles, international dimensions and 
associations, the role of the Internet and stated motivations) and investigative variables 






















Analysis Part 1: Statistical Summary and Background Variables 
Table 1 summarizes the analysis of background variables of individuals included in the 
sample, each of which are discussed below, beginning with the statistical summary. 
 
Table 1. Statistical summary and background variable information of Canadian Islamist 
militants beginning their careers before and after 9/11 (1980s-2011).  
 
 




Statistical Summary of Canadian Islamist Terrorism Cases 
 
Figure 1. Numbers of Canadian residents/ citizens involved in Islamist terrorism according to 
when they began and ceased offending. 
*Note that since it is unknown when/if some individuals have ended their terrorism careers, 
the number of individuals ended (55) is less than those who began (64).  
 
Figure 1 shows the frequency of individuals in the sample according to when they began and 
ceased to offend. It is noteworthy that although we often have reliable information about 
when individuals cease to offend (usually by arrest or death) there is much less reliable 
information about when individuals begin to offend, even though this is perhaps of greater 
interest. If we focus only on when individuals are arrested, this gives a delayed impression of 
when levels of radicalization and terrorist activity are actually peaking, potentially obscuring 
analysis of additional factors that might be contributing, and arguably telling us more about 
counter-terrorism than terrorists.  
The starting points for offending are based on the first known overt behaviour in 
support of terrorism (e.g. travelling to Afghanistan). Thus they do not capture earlier 
processes of radicalization and almost certainly underestimate offence periods in some cases. 
Although not exact, this information nevertheless approximates the beginning of individual 
jihadi careers and allows an assessment of levels of offending against wider contextual 
factors. The initial peak in the 1990s relates to North African networks, which grew in the 





















Islamist Terrorism in Canada: 1980s-2011
Individuals began
Individuals ended*




Afghanistan were thriving. The apparent drop in individuals beginning to offend after the 
1990s is at least partially a product of the way that the graph is constructed (i.e. the first two 
time-points represent full decades, after which the graph is divided into single years). 
However, it is worth noting that very few individuals began their jihadi careers in the years 
immediately following 9/11. This may relate to the previous dismantling of jihadi networks 
following the arrest of Ahmed Ressam- in other words a removal of human infrastructure that 
otherwise might have facilitated swifter mobilisation. It may also reflect the collective 
psychological impact that the September 11th attacks had in Canada combined with 
restrictions brought about by the ‘War on Terror’64. The fact that there was not another peak 
until 2005 (the Toronto 18 case) likely relates to the fact that Canada did not overtly support 
the invasion of Iraq (as compared to Australia and the UK where there were peaks in 200465), 
combined with gradual disillusionment with the war in Afghanistan.66 Rates of terrorism also 
undoubtedly relate to the presence of individual terrorist entrepreneurs or recruiters and the 
localised spread of extremist ideology,67 which may appear to occur almost at ‘random’, but 
are also tied to much wider global developments.  
As shown in Table 1 above there has been an average of 2.2 individuals (or 2 cases/ 
groups) per year in the pre-9/11 period, compared to 2.6 individuals (1.4 cases) post-9/11, up 
to and including 2011. Bearing in mind that there were likely more individuals offending in 
the pre-9/11 era that we simply don’t have information about, at face value these figures 
reflect a practically identical rate of individuals. They also superficially indicate an apparent 
tendency to be part of slightly larger groups (although this also reflects the way that 
individuals were grouped into cases- because members of the Kamel network in fact led quite 
distinct offending careers they were largely treated as separate cases, but in reality they were 
closely associated with one another and could arguably be classed as a single case). This 
highlights the fact that figures by themselves can be misleading, and must be combined with 
in-depth qualitative understanding of the different individuals and cases. 
Finally, it is also important to note that the apparent decline in cases beginning in the 
last few years is potentially misleading because if there are in fact such cases (which would 
include numerous unnamed individuals believed to have gone to Somalia to fight for al-










In terms of the classification of individuals, Table 1 reveals that close to 50% of those who 
began their jihadi careers before 9/11 (16/35 individuals) were subject to overseas 
prosecutions68 (including Egypt, France, Algeria, Tunisia and the US); a further 26% (9 
individuals) were subject to extra-judicial sanctions (mostly issued from 2001-2003), 
consisting of 4 security certificates, 2 UN sanctions, 2 individuals detained in Guantanamo 
and 1 individual deported as a “danger to the public”69; the remainder involved limited 
confessions, people killed overseas, legal allegations (all foreign); and public allegations. 
Nobody was prosecuted in Canada. Among those who began offending after 9/11 the picture 
is very different. Almost half (13 individuals) have been successfully prosecuted in Canada; 
another 31% are currently facing legal allegations (all but 1 in Canadian courts); and the rest 
are made up of a handful of public allegations, overseas fatalities and offender admissions. 
None of the post-9/11 starters have been subject to extra-judicial sanctions. Overall, these 
results quite clearly demonstrate a more proactive and effective counter-terrorism apparatus 






















Geographic Distribution of Cases
 
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of Canadian residents/ citizens involved in Islamist 
terrorism (1980s-2011). Numbers indicate individuals 
9/11. 
 
Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of individuals in the sample. The se
indicate the number of individuals in each city/ town
jihadi careers before or after 9/11
mobility, meaning some individuals are counted 
9/11: 29n post-9/11). There are two main findings of note. First, Islamist militants in Canada 
are primarily located in major urban areas, and in particular in Montreal (
sample) and the Greater Toronto A
Canadian Muslim population (located primarily in
which should not be surprising as it is from within this much larger population that jihadis 
emerge. The second finding of interest is that there has been a geographical shift in the 
distribution of cases over time. Montreal has become less significant with the dismantling of 
the Kamel network, while Toronto has comparatively increased in significance.
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time more-or-less isolated cases have occurred in a more diverse range of locations 
(Edmonton, Winnipeg, Pembroke and Maskinongé72) while in other locations cases have not 
reoccurred over time (Leduc, Hamilton, St Catharines and Chicoutimi).  
These findings are significant for understanding the social transmission of terrorism, 
since they demonstrate that cases can occur in new locations and will not inevitably reoccur 
in the same places over time (i.e. jihadi networks can be dismantled with seemingly lasting 
effects). However, the continued significance of Toronto (and in particular the Scarborough 
area) over time, suggests that lasting pro-jihadi subcultures can develop, creating enduring 
‘hotspots’ which cannot be extinguished by arrests alone. As described below, there have also 
been changes in the ethnic profile of individuals involved in terrorism in Canada which 
correspond to global developments and to the respective populations of Montreal and 
Toronto. Specifically, while North Africa used to be a more prominent global hotspot in the 
1990s (and North Africans make up the larger proportion of Muslims in Quebec73), Pakistan 
and Somalia have become globally more significant since 9/11, and these ethnicities make up 
larger percentages of Muslims in Ontario.74   
 
Demographic Profiles 
Table 1 confirms that the entire sample, both before and after 9/11, is made up of young 
males. The average age range (corresponding to the start and end of offence periods) was 
28.6-32.9 in the pre-9/11 period, compared to 23.6-24.5 in the post-9/11 period. These ages 
are in the same average range (i.e. twenties to early thirties) as found in global,75 European,76 
Australian,77 and British and American78 samples of Islamist militants. They are consistent 
with shorter offence periods (see below) and they also confirm, as other studies have, that 
there has been a decrease in average age over time.79 This is likely the product of a 
combination of factors, including wider exposure to jihadi ideology (in particular by way of 
the Internet, which has become ubiquitous in the lives of young people), missing information 
about when some of the earlier individuals began their careers (overestimating these ages), 
and the fact that Islamist militants are far more likely to be detected and apprehended more 
quickly now than in the past.  
The fact that the sample is dominated by males is also not surprising, although we 
might have expected to find at least some females involved in terrorism in Canada since this 
has occurred in other Western countries, particularly in the post-9/11 period (e.g. Colleen 
LaRose in the US, Roshanara Choudhary in the UK). There are, however, signs that Canadian 
females are getting involved in Islamist terrorism also, despite their absence from the current 




sample. A peripheral example comes from the Toronto 18 case, where Fahim Ahmad’s sister-
in-law reportedly fuelled discussions on the merits of jihad with Ahmad and a now convicted 
British terrorist, Aabid Khan.80 In mid-2011, it was reported that two unnamed females (one 
later identified as Asli Nur) from within Toronto’s Somali community are believed to have 
gone to Somalia to join with al-Shabaab81 (excluded from the sample pending more reliable 
information). Similarly, a mid-2012 report suggests that one Fadumo Jama, aka ‘Mama 
Shabaab’, from Toronto, had been running an al-Shabaab safe-house south of Mogadishu for 
at least four years.82 More recently still, Amanda Karody became the first female to be 
charged with planning a jihadist-inspired, domestic terrorist attack. Based on this, and taking 
into account the experience of other Western countries, it is reasonable to expect confirmed 
cases of female participation in Islamist terrorist activity in Canada in the future. 
 Residency and nationality are further demographic variables of interest. For those 
who began offending prior to 9/11, 29% of individuals (10 people) entered the country by 
illegal means (false passports) but 71% acquired permanent residency rights (including being 
granted asylum) or full citizenship. In the post 9/11 sample there have been no confirmed 
cases of illegal entry and everyone in the sample had permanent residency or full citizenship. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the increase in number of individuals born in Canada over time is not 
as large as might have been expected (1 individual (3%) pre-9/11 versus 5 individuals (17%) 
post-9/11). Similar studies of Islamist militants in the US, Australia and the UK indicate that 
these percentages are much higher in these countries (46%, 57% and 64% respectively83). 
The situation in Canada might partially be a reflection of a relatively young, still growing 
immigrant population but it is unclear if this is much different to the US and Australia. This 
raises the question of whether there is something unique about growing up in Canada that 
might serve as a ‘protective’ influence. However, it is also important to recognise that many 
of those not born in Canada nevertheless grew up there. In other words, as in other Western 
countries, Islamist terrorism in Canada is indeed ‘home-grown’ in the sense that individuals 
are radicalizing and turning to terrorism there, as opposed to coming to the country for that 
purpose. In terms of nationality, pre-9/11 offenders were more often North African (31% 
Algerian, 23% Egyptian, 9% Moroccan) while more in the post-9/11 era have been Canadian 
(17%), Pakistani (17%) or Somali (14%). It was mentioned above that these changes 
correspond to changes in the global jihadi context, but it is worth elaborating that –as the 
percentages show, and as is the case more generally- ethnicity has become a more diverse 
affair among Canadian militants over time. This of course means that ethnic profiling is 




unlikely to be a productive investigative technique, although this does not preclude 
geographical profiling of ‘hotspots’. 
 Given that most pre-9/11 offenders came to Canada from foreign countries and were 
not subject to the same levels of scrutiny as individuals are today, there is often less available 
information about their backgrounds, including education. This was available for only 40% of 
the pre-9/11 sample (13 individuals) compared to 79% (23 individuals) post-9/11. With this 
in mind, at least 20% of the earlier offenders had completed high school and at least 17% had 
completed university, compared to 52% and 24% respectively since then. Whilst at first 
glance this may appear considerably lower than some studies have found,84 this is at least 
partly due to differences in the way that figures are reported (i.e. whether they are expressed 
as a percentage of the number for whom there is information, or the total sample). Where the 
same method of reporting is used, based on similar sampling techniques, focusing on the US, 
UK and Australia, the results are more directly comparable.85  Regardless of these 
comparisons, it is clear that Islamist terrorists in Canada generally have at least basic 
education, and a significant minority go on to complete degrees at university. This seems to 
contradict the notion that individuals become involved in terrorism because of lacking 
education.  
 Looking at occupations, information was available for 57% (20 individuals) and 79% 
(23 individuals) of the respective samples. Although not explicitly shown in Table 1, among 
pre-9/11 starters the largest proportion (20%, or 7 individuals) were in semi-skilled 
occupations such as truck-driver or shop-keeper. This was followed by skilled occupations 
(such as computer technician or school principle) and students. In the post-9/11 period more 
individuals were students or unemployed, and more were in unskilled occupations (such as 
security guard or fast-food worker). The same numbers of individuals across time periods 
were found in high school (2) and in skilled employment (4). These results indicate that there 
is a consistent minority of high achievers among Canadian jihadis, albeit within the context 
of an overall slight reduction in socio-economic standing. This is likely related to changes in 
age (see above) and, bearing in mind differences in reporting, is generally consistent with 
findings from previous studies.86 
 Another area showing some evidence of change is in the religious background of 
individuals. 100% of the sample were Muslims, but there have been more converts involved 
over time (1 person or 3% compared to 4 people or 14%) which is again comparable to 
previous findings from other Western nations.87 There was not enough information about 
individual upbringings and religious practices to offer a more informative analysis of 




religion; however it was not uncommon for reports to mention that people (including ‘born’ 
Muslims) had lived previously Westernized lifestyles and had only become more noticeably 
religious in the years or months prior to offending. This suggests that levels of religious 
knowledge were generally lacking and offers some support to the argument that having 
greater religious knowledge and understanding from a young age may well help guard against 
radicalization (and in line with this, recent research has shown that non-violent Islamist 
‘radicals’ are more likely to have a more nuanced understanding of their faith than those who 
turn to violence).88 
 Marriage, on the other hand, does not appear to be a protective factor against 
involvement in Islamist terrorism. Practically the same proportion (37% and 38%, or 13 
individuals vs. 11), both before and after 9/11 were married, and although there was more 
missing information (40% vs. 14%) among the earlier cohort, this has very little implication 
for the analysis (in fact most individuals for whom marriage is not reported are likely to be 
unmarried, since this is a ‘human interest’ detail that the press often report when present). 
This is also congruent with previous research, confirming that marriage is common among 
jihadis.89   
 Information about previous criminal records was generally lacking (60% unknown 
versus 72% unknown) although it is worth noting that where criminal histories are present 
they are likely to be reported if significant. Among the 34% (12 individuals) in the pre-9/11 
period who had criminal records, 92% of these were for dishonesty-related offences- 
primarily fraud, use of false identity documents and theft. This is a reflection of how some of 
these offenders entered Canada in the first place, and also relates to the significant criminal 
activities of the Kamel network in particular. It is also worth noting that some members of the 
Kamel network were prosecuted on similar criminal charges in relation to their terrorism 
convictions. One person (Hassan Zemiri) had also been previously arrested on drugs 
charges.90 By contrast, just 4 individuals (14%) of the post-9/11 sample had confirmed 
criminal records, including a drugs charge (Maiwand Yar91), a domestic violence charge 
(Said Namouh92), shoplifting (Nishanthan Yogakrishnan93) and illegally possessing and 
importing firearms (Mohammed Ali Dirie94). This is clearly not the whole picture (e.g. 
several members of the Toronto 18 group successfully shoplifted chocolate bars during a 
training camp expedition95) yet it raises some interesting questions.  
It has been previously suggested that criminality among jihadis has been on the 
increase since 9/11 because autonomous or semi-autonomous groups can no longer take 
advantage of central handouts from al-Qaeda, meaning they must fund themselves.96 At first 




glance, the results here do not seem to show much support for this. However, it is worth 
noting that both Yogakrishnan and Dirie committed their offences in furtherance of terrorism. 
There are also several others among the post-9/11 cohort who earned criminal convictions in 
conjunction with their terrorism offences, which are more revealing. One of Mohammad 
Momin Khawaja’s convictions was for instructing an unwitting female associate to open a 
bank account and transfer funds to a female in Britain who was in turn acting on behalf of 
terrorists there97 (essentially fraud); Fahim Ahmad also pleaded guilty for complicity in 
Dirie’s attempt to smuggle firearms into Canada from the US98; Steven Chand of the Toronto 
18 was convicted for counselling to commit fraud over $5,00099; Said Namouh was convicted 
for extortion in association with a terrorist group100; and Matin Abdul Stanikzy was charged 
with counselling a female associate to commit theft in his attempt to obtain explosives.101 
Overall, these findings show that most Islamist terrorists in Canada are not career 
criminals.102 This is especially the case more recently, following the demise of relatively 
well-established criminal-terrorist networks that functioned during the 1990s. Based on the 
available information, the recent wave of militants are less likely to have a previous record, 
and where they do, it may well be unrelated to their involvement in terrorism.103 However, it 
is also apparent that criminality –generally related to funding or availability of materiel- 
sometimes forms a part of terrorist conspiracies. 
The final background variable here is mental health. Previous studies have shown that 
mental illness only appears to occur in a very small minority of Islamist militants and on the 
whole it does not help explain their behaviour.104 Although specific information on this 
variable is lacking (over 90% unknown) this can quite reasonably be regarded as a general 
failure to report on its absence. Only 1 person in the entire sample (Asad Ansari of the 
Toronto 18105) was reported to have experienced some form of illness (depression) prior to 
offending. These findings are in accordance with the majority of recent research on this 
issue106 and offer no support to the idea that involvement in terrorism might be generally 
explained by some form of psychopathology. 
 
Radicalization 
There is an unfortunate, but acute shortage of reliable and meaningful information pertaining 
to individual pathways of radicalization (defined here as the psychological, emotional and 
behavioural process preceding involvement in terrorism107). This of course should not be 
surprising though, given that these processes are necessarily pieced together in retrospect, 
often years after the fact. For the purposes of this study, the primary aim here was to assess 




whether processes of radicalization could be classified as primarily virtual (online), social 
(face-to-face) or a mixture of the two. Unsurprisingly, there was very little evidence of any 
online activity in the pre-9/11 period. Only 2 individuals (the Jabarah brothers) were classed 
as having radicalized via a mixture of social and virtual processes, since they were known to 
frequent jihadi websites in addition to being influenced by social contacts.108 The remainder 
were either classed as having radicalized primarily via social processes (37% or 13 
individuals) or were unknown (57%, 20 individuals). However, in reality the vast majority of 
‘unknowns’ would of course have radicalized in social situations since the Internet either did 
not exist or was largely unavailable and offending often occurred in the context of established 
organizations.  
 In the post-9/11 period there was still a great deal of missing information (55%, 16 
individuals) but 2 individuals (7%) were classed as primarily socially radicalized (referring to 
Omar Khadr and Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed). The remaining 38% (consisting of the 11 
convicted members of the Toronto 18) were classed as having radicalized via a mixture of 
online activity and social interaction. Fahim Ahmad, one of the group leaders, was active in 
online Islamic forums since at least 2002109 and online jihadi propaganda became “the de-
facto catalyst” for the radicalization of the group.110 Ahmad created and distributed his own 
highly emotive DVDs; he would print out online texts and give them to members of the group 
to read; and he would instruct them to check out websites promoting jihad, in addition to 
playing speeches by Anwar al-Awlaki and others in group situations.111 Online jihadi 
propaganda was absorbed both individually and collectively, and served as the basis for face-
to-face group discussions.  
Although no ‘virtual only’ cases were confirmed in the Canadian sample, there are 
others, such as Said Namouh, who was seemingly acting alone in Canada and who offended 
primarily online, suggesting that the Internet may well have played a wider role in 
radicalization than the current data reveal. It is safe to conclude that face-to-face social 
interaction still appears to be an important factor in radicalization, but that it is likely to be 
supplemented and enhanced by online jihadi propaganda. The fact that individuals in other 
Western countries (such as Ryan Anderson112 in the US or Nicky Reilly113 in the UK) do 
seem to have radicalized online almost entirely by themselves, means that this cannot be 
ruled out in the Canadian context. Moreover, the spread of ideology via the Internet may also 
have contributed to the geographic spread of cases out-with hotspots, discussed above. 
 
Ideological Classification 




A related point of interest is whether individuals can be classified according to levels of 
ideological commitment. There is insufficient information to enable a refined and reliable 
system of classification on this variable; however, it is generally possible to distinguish 
between a) individuals who show at least some evidence of adhering to jihadi ideology (the 
vast majority, here simply termed ‘Jihadi’), b) those who appear to be particularly committed 
to the cause (‘Hardcore’) as evidenced by such factors as sustained and varied activities in 
support of terrorism, often including first-hand experience of violence, and c) ideological 
outliers (individuals who appear to be involved for distinct reasons such as personal motives 
or financial gain). 
 89% of the earlier cohort (31 individuals) and 86% of the latter cohort (25 
individuals) were classed as Jihadis, meaning that they appeared to subscribe to jihadi 
ideology, but –with the exception of the ‘Hardcore’ sub-category- no further judgement was 
made as to differing levels or types of commitment within that very broad category. Just 3 
individuals (9%) in the pre-9/11 sample were classed as Hardcore (these were Ahmed Said 
Khadr, Fateh Kamel and Karim Said Atmani) although numerous others might arguably be 
included. Only 1 individual in the post-9/11 sample was classed as Hardcore, namely Faruq 
Khalil Muhammad ’Isa, who is accused of working over a relatively lengthy period of time to 
send suicide bombers to Iraq. ’Isa allegedly encouraged recruits to persevere when they 
showed signs of doubt, made enquiries about conducting violence himself, and told his sister 
“Go learn about weapons and go attack the police and the Americans. Let it be that you 
die”.114 The fact that a minority of individuals were classed as Hardcore is consistent with 
previous analyses which suggest that the jihadi movement on the whole is driven by a 
minority of ideologically committed ‘entrepreneurs’,115 although it is quite possible that other 
highly committed individuals were missed, since this classification relies on sufficient 
information. 
 Judgements about ideological outliers are more reliable. Among pre-9/11 starters this 
included just 1 individual, Abdurahman Khadr, who was known for being a reluctant 
participant at the al-Qaeda training camps and seems to have rejected the idea of violence.116 
In the post-9/11 sample Abdurahman’s little brother Omar was classed as ‘unknown’ because 
he was a minor at the time of offending, essentially making him a child soldier and unlikely 
to have been genuinely ideologically informed. In addition, Shareef Abdelhaleem of the 
Toronto 18 was classed as a criminal opportunist as well as being Jihadi, since he appeared to 
be at least partially motivated by a desire to try and make money.117 Lastly, Mohamed 
Abdullahi Mohamed, who fought alongside al-Shabaab in Somalia, seemed to be motivated 




by nationalism and apparently disagreed with their ideology even then.118 He has also since 
spoken out against al-Shabaab in support of counter-radicalization in Canada. Taken together, 
these ‘outlier’ cases are too few to indicate systematic differences between earlier and more 
recent generations of Canadian militants, but they confirm previous findings119 showing that 
not everyone involved in Islamist terrorism is necessarily committed to jihadi ideology. 
 
Analysis Part 2: Operational Variables 
Table 2 below summarizes the findings in relation to operational variables of Canadian 
Islamist militant- in other words, what exactly they have been doing in support of terrorism. 
 
Group Characteristics 
Terrorism is generally a group phenomenon, making group characteristics a key area of 
interest. Even basic descriptive features such as immediate group size are, however, difficult 
to determine due to ‘fuzzy boundaries’, individual mobility and fluid networks. Because of 
this, quantitative figures as presented in Table 2 tell us little, except that Canadian Islamist 
militants tend to offend in relatively small groups, and that most cases are connected to wider 





















Table 2. Operational variable information of Canadian Islamist militants beginning their 
careers before and after 9/11 (1980s-2011). 
 
 




In terms of leadership, this is also difficult to determine since it is rarely explicitly manifest 
and quality data are generally lacking. The data that are available do not support the 
contention that operational leaders and ‘spiritual sanctioners’120 (religious ideologues) are 
universal roles within groups. There was also very little evidence, either before or after 9/11, 
that demonstrated issuing and following of orders, although a notable exception on these 
points is the Toronto 18 group where Fahim Ahmad and Zakariya Amara played quite clear 
leadership roles. More recently, it has been alleged that Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, 
(accused of the train derailment plot), were being supported by al-Qaeda elements in Iran, 
however the nature and extent of that support is presently unclear.121 In general, groups 
appear to have been informally organized and leadership appears to have emerged by way of 
consensus based on individual initiative, experience, knowledge, connections and capacity to 
organize group activities.  
 Both before and after 9/11 Canadian militant activities can best be described as 
collaborative and yet most often tied to foreign organizational hierarchies involving 
recognized figures of authority, with autonomy varying depending on context and role. 
Whilst operating in Canada individuals have had considerable autonomy to choose and 
organize their own activities; however they have often maintained communication with 
foreign militants in order to coordinate their efforts. When overseas themselves (e.g. while 
training or taking part in combat) they have functioned more directly as part of militaristic 
structures. Thus, for example, Mohammed Abdullah Warsame would have been fully 
absorbed into al-Qaeda and Taliban hierarchies whilst training and fighting in Afghanistan 
from 2000-2001, but his continued support activities in North America were primarily self-
organized.122 Individuals such as Hassan Farhat123 or Mohamed Elmi Ibrahim124 who have 
trained and/or fought overseas since 9/11 have been equally absorbed into foreign 
organizational structures. Others, such as Mohammad Momin Khawaja (who assisted British 
militants125), Said Namouh (who was an online Global Islamic Media Front collaborator126) 
and Faruq’Isa (who allegedly helped send recruits to Iraq127) can best be described as semi-
autonomous.  
 Given the fact that autonomy has been assumed to be a defining feature of Western-
based Islamist terrorists in the post 9/11 era,128 these results are surprising. It is worth noting 
though that some cases fit this description more closely than others, in particular the Toronto 
18 (who made ultimately unproductive links to British and American jihadis129) and Salman 
An-Noor Hossain (who independently set up his own anti-Semitic, pro-militant website130). 
Based on currently available information, the cases of Abdul Matin Stanikzy (allegedly 




planning to attack a Canadian military base131) and Mohamed Hassan Hersi (accused of 
planning to join al-Shabaab132) might also fall into this category. Thus, while it is still 
common for Canadian Islamist militants to collaborate with overseas co-conspirators, there 
have also been cases in recent years which demonstrate a willingness to pursue a terrorist 
agenda in the absence of external support.  
 
Offence Period 
As mentioned above, the beginning of offence periods are designated by the first known overt 
behaviour in support of terrorism and do not include preceding periods of radicalization 
(which would be even more difficult to determine). Offence periods generally end via arrest, 
death or the apparent voluntary cessation of behaviour in support of terrorism, although some 
cases appear to be ongoing. Cases where either the start or end-date is unknown are excluded 
from the analysis (5 cases pre-9/11, 6 cases post-9/11). Based on these calculations Table 2 
reveals that the average offence period has decreased from 5.5 years to an average of just 1 
year (and most frequently it has been less than this). These figures are in accordance with 
previous findings from other Western nations133 and reflect the fact that while in the past 
individuals could have quite lengthy jihadi careers without fear of intervention, counter-
terrorism resources have dramatically increased since 2001 and individuals are more likely to 
be arrested sooner. 
 
Operational Activity 
The largest proportion of individuals in the sample both before and after 9/11 (55% and 38%, 
or 18 vs. 11 individuals) involved facilitating violent jihad. This included a range of activities 
aimed at enabling others to develop skills (train), travel, or otherwise perform duties in 
relation to Islamist terrorism. Examples among pre-9/11 starters include Essam Hafez 
Marzouk, who was an alleged trainer of mujahideen, including two individuals responsible 
for the August 1998 east African embassy bombings.134 Another example is Abdullah Ahmed 
Khadr who trafficked weapons for al-Qaeda.135 Post-9/11 examples include Mohammad 
Momin Khawaja, who built a remote detonator for others to use,136 Zakaria Amara of the 
Toronto 18, who organized the activities of others in the group,137 and Nishanthan 
Yogakrishnan who shop-lifted supplies at the behest of Fahim Ahmad.138 These examples 
show that facilitating behaviours (whether top-down, collaborative, or bottom-up) continue to 
form a significant part of terrorist activity, while the relative reduction over time may be 
related to lower levels of organizational integration. 




 The next most common behaviour in the pre-9/11 sample (29%, 10 individuals) 
involved overseas paramilitary-style training, but where combat or planning of attacks has 
not been confirmed. Among others this included the el-Maati brothers Ahmad and Amer,139 
Adil Charkaoui,140 and Amr Hamed.141 A further 17% (6 individuals) from the early part of 
the sample went on to become jihadi fighters who took part in overseas combat (e.g. Ahmed 
Said Khadr,142 Abdullahi Afrah143 and Abdulrahman Mansour Jabarah144). By contrast, only 2 
individuals in the post-9/11 sample (7%) were classed as having received overseas training 
without confirmation of combat (Ferid Ahmed Imam and Maiwand Yar, the former who 
allegedly graduated to providing training, thus making him a facilitator also145). However, 
another 7 people (24% of the post-9/11 sample) underwent some form of training and also 
became jihadi fighters (examples include Omar Khadr146 and Saeed and Masoud Rasoul147). 
An additional 2 people (Jahmaal James148 and Mohamed Hassan Hersi149) attempted to go 
overseas for training and combat, and at least another 6 individuals (all part of the Toronto 18 
group) engaged in domestic training exercises without even attempting to go overseas. These 
results show that overseas training and combat remain popular goals for Canadian militants, 
but ones that are not always fulfilled, and which may be substituted for domestic activities.  
Given that terrorism is synonymous with ‘random’ acts of violence in peoples’ minds, 
it is perhaps surprising that only 17% (6 individuals including Ahmed Ressam and his 
helpers, Mohammed Mansour Jabarah and Abdel Rahman Fakhri Abou el-Ila, who was 
convicted in Egypt150) have been directly involved in planning attacks prior to 9/11. This 
figure has risen to 9 individuals (31%) since then (including 4 members of the Toronto 18, 
Said Namouh –who was also planning an overseas suicide attack151- Hiva Mohammad 
Alizadeh’s group, and Matin Stanikzy). Notably, all of the pre-9/11 attack plots were aimed 
at foreign targets, whereas 3 of the 4 (alleged) post-9/11 plots have been aimed at Canadian 
targets.152 Again, there is similarity with other Western countries where domestic Islamist 
terrorism plots have been uncovered since 2001, showing that militancy in Canada has 
followed wider trends, even if it is on a smaller scale.   
 Less common –or at least less clearly documented- has been fundraising on behalf of 
others (9% and 10% -both 3 individuals- before and after 9/11). In the past this appears to 
have been done more openly and seemingly on a larger scale (e.g. Ahmed Khadr giving 
speeches and asking people for donations) compared to small-scale funding by individuals 
relying on their own resources (e.g. Khawaja sending a few thousand dollars of his own 
money). This is consistent with reports that counter-financing efforts have been successful in 
reducing the flow of money to al-Qaeda.153 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that terrorism-




financing is often difficult to detect and this part of the analysis in particular may fall short of 
providing a comprehensive snapshot of the situation in Canada. For example, the 
Benevolence International Fund Canada (BIF-C, established in Mississauga in 2000) was 
closely tied to the Benevolence International Foundation in the US, both of which had their 
assets frozen for suspected ties to terrorism in November 2002.154 More recently, the 
Canadian branch of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY, established in 
Mississauga in 1999 and active until 2005) was closely tied to BIF-C among other suspicious 
organisations and had its charitable status revoked for failing to comply with Canada 
Revenue Agency (CRA) requirements.155 There have not been any specific allegations of 
fundraising for terrorism and criminal prosecutions have not been pursued against Canadians 
involved in running these charities. Hence, even where such cases are suspected they may be 
especially difficult to prove.  
 Turning attention to the active promotion of jihad (essentially trying to recruit or 
influence others by glorifying terrorism) there was little evidence of this among Canadian 
militants within either cohort. In the pre-9/11 sample Ahmed Khadr was known to “praise the 
bravery” of mujahideen on his trips to Canada and of course raised his sons to be militants.156 
Abderraouf Hannachi of the Kamel network has also been credited with influencing Ressam 
to go overseas for training,157 but beyond these two borderline examples, there is no further 
specific information on promotional activities (distinct to simply talking about jihad amongst 
members of a group). Whilst it is quite possible that others in the sample (such as Fateh 
Kamel158) were also active in promoting jihad, there is insufficient evidence to support this in 
the analysis. After 9/11, there have been 4 individuals that can be reliably described as 
promoting jihad. These are Fahim Ahmad, Said Namouh, Salman An-Noor Hossain, and 
Mohamed Hassan Hersi (who is also charged with counselling another person to engage in 
terrorism159). It is significant that Namouh and Hossain were both exclusively online jihadi 
promoters, demonstrating the way in which the growth of the Internet has opened up new 
avenues of opportunity for Islamist militants (and confirming that Canadians have adopted 
technology in similar fashion to other Western jihadis). Perhaps even more importantly 
though, when we compare Canadian ‘promoters’ to others such as Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza 
and Abdullah el-Faisal from the UK or Anwar al-Awlaki from the US, there is a marked 
difference. Canada has clearly not hosted a globally renowned ideologue with established 
connections to bona fide militants, nor have its online jihadi promoters been as prolific or 
admired as the likes of Aabid Khan, Younis Tsouli or Samir Khan. This comparative absence 




of highly influential individuals dedicated to propagating the ideology helps explain Canada’s 
relatively low rate of Islamist terrorism. 
 The final operational role found among Canadian militants was membership in a 
terrorist network where no further information was available about what exactly they did. 
This referred to Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, Mohamed Harkat and Mahmoud Jaballah, each of 
whom began their militant careers in the 1990s and were detained on security certificates. 
This category does not include others who were members of terrorist networks whose 
specific role is known and is a by-product of insufficient information. As discussed above in 
relation to individual classifications, these results also suggest that counter-terrorism in 
Canada has become more effective over the years since more recent allegations are specific 
and more clearly substantiated. 
 Regardless of role differences, Table 2 also shows that 86% (30 individuals) in the 
pre-9/11 category were focused exclusively overseas in terms of what they were trying to 
achieve, and a corresponding figure of 86% travelled overseas in furtherance of those goals. 
By contrast, up until the end of 2011 only 45% of post-9/11 Canadian militants (13 
individuals) have been focused exclusively on overseas events while the remainder have 
shown at least some willingness or desire to affect change by way of domestic operations. 
Similarly only 41% (12 individuals) in the post-9/11 category have travelled overseas in 
relation to their jihadi activities. As previously discussed in relation to targets of attack, these 
findings resonate with the growth of ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism in the West more 
generally and confirm that Canada has become a legitimate target in the eyes of jihadis. At 
the same time, we must not ignore the fact that participation in overseas conflict remains a 
highly sought-after prize. Indeed, this accounts for the majority of known cases uncovered 
from 2012-2013.   
 
International Dimensions and Associations 
International connections were discussed in relation to leadership, but are dealt with here in 
terms of location and type of associations. All cases that began before9/11 (and almost all 
individuals within those cases) had established ties to foreign militants. The majority of those 
ties (66% or 23 individuals) were to al-Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Af/Pak), 
followed by France, Egypt, Bosnia (14% or 5 individuals each) and the UK (11%, 4 
individuals). Other locations included Algeria, Italy, Libya, Somalia, Yemen, the US, 
Chechnya, South East Asia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Lebanon and Azerbaijan. Among those 
beginning in the post-9/11 period 73% of cases (but only 48% of individuals) established 




contact with foreign terrorists. The top location has remained the Af-Pak region, but this has 
reduced to 14% (4 individuals), which is equalled by Iraq. This is followed by the UK and 
US (both 10%, 3 individuals), Somalia (7%, 2 individuals) and Chechnya, Austria and 
Tunisia (each 1 individual or 3%). These figures are not the entire story, since numerous 
unnamed individuals thought to have gone to Somalia are not included in the sample due to 
lacking information, and for that reason there has likely been a more pronounced shift 
towards the Horn of Africa as a key location. Additional, recent cases involving Canadians 
who joined al-Shabaab support this assessment; however Canadian jihadis have also since 
joined or been in contact with militants in Mauritania, Algeria and Iran, and as many as 50 
individuals are estimated to have joined the conflict in Syria.160 Ultimately, the current results 
clearly indicate a change over time, with international associations becoming less 
concentrated within one primary region, and more dispersed, according to changing 
international circumstances and individual opportunities. 
Moreover, the overall quality of connections has also changed. Pre-9/11 offenders 
were linked to members of established foreign terrorist networks, if not identifiable 
organizations, who commanded considerable resources. Although individuals have still been 
able to make such connections (such as Imam and Yar, Faruq ’Isa and the various ‘Jihadi 
Fighters’), others have managed only fleeting and relatively empty connections to other 
aspiring militants who were not part of organizations and did not have much to offer in terms 
of resources. Khawaja’s British friends relied on him for technical expertise and money, and 
Fahim Ahmad’s connections with American and British militants did not, in the end, yield 
results. Even among those who have made contact with foreign terrorist organizations such as 
al-Shabaab, there was little evidence that those individuals received the same kind of support 
as for example, Ressam did- at least not outside of foreign theatres of conflict. Hence, the 
data up to and including 2011 suggest that foreign connections are not always as meaningful 
as in the past, lending support to the contention that Western-based terrorists have become 
more (involuntarily) autonomous and more ‘amateurish’ over time. Practical restraints may 
have also contributed to the growing domestic focus of operations, suggesting that this may 
be the result of pragmatic concerns as much as ideological developments. This does not of 
course mean that we can rule out the possibility that individuals may still be trained up 
overseas and sent back to Canada to carry out attacks. Indeed, current information on the al-
Qaeda-linked train derailment plot indicates that Essaghaier may have received training in 
Iran before returning to Montreal.161 Nevertheless, it is also important to note that he had 
been evicted from his apartment for problematic behaviour and was effectively homeless at 




the time of his arrest- factors which are hardly suggestive of sophisticated training or high 
levels of ongoing support.162  
Finally, the degree of connectivity of individuals in the sample can also be crudely 
measured by examining named associations, both foreign and domestic. As shown in Table 2, 
71% of the pre-9/11 sample (25 individuals) had named foreign associations and 74% of 
them (26 individuals) had named domestic associations (i.e. connections to other Canadian-
based terrorists outside their immediate case). This shows a high degree of connectivity both 
internationally and within the militant community of Canada. In comparison, only 34% of the 
post-9/11 sample (10 individuals) had named foreign associates, and only 13% (4 
individuals) had named domestic associates. This suggests that we know less about the 
foreign connections of those who have them (as for example when individuals are absorbed 
into the conflict in Somalia) while on the domestic stage Islamist terrorism has become more 
fragmented.163  
 
The Role of the Internet 
It is now generally accepted that the Internet plays an important role in the lives of Western-
based jihadis; however, analysts differ in the emphasis that they place upon this 
technology.164 In accordance with findings regarding radicalization, no use of the Internet 
could be determined for the vast majority of pre-9/11 starters, but of course many of them 
were operating before it was invented. Uses that were reported among the early cohort 
included accessing propaganda (the Jabarah brothers165), communication (Mohammed 
Jabarah166; Mohammed Warsame167), and fundraising (Ahmed Khadr168). Others almost 
certainly made use of the Internet also (for example Kassem Daher collaborated with others 
who raised funds online169) but it is safe to say that it has become more prominent over 
time.170  
 Information was available for 69% of the post-9/11 starters (20 individuals). The top 
reported uses included accessing propaganda and/or pro-jihadi forums (14 individuals or 
48%), followed by communication (applying to 31% of the sample or 9 individuals), creating 
and distributing pro-jihadi materials (14%, 4 individuals), conducting research related to 
attacks (Khawaja; Amara), and making purchases for terrorist activity (again referring to 
Amara, who seemingly purchased IED components online171). Again, percentages are 
unlikely to be precise given missing information; however, the results clearly demonstrate 
that Canadian Islamist militants are using the Internet for a variety of purposes. More general 
and ‘benign’ uses, such as viewing propaganda and communicating appear to be the most 




common, while the more ‘assertive’, innovative or operation-specific behaviours are 
somewhat rarer and depend upon the nature of the case.  
 
Stated Motivations  
Stated motivations, whether made in private or in public, provide an important window into 
the mindset of Islamist terrorists. There was not, however, a great deal of publicly available 
information available for many of the individuals in the sample, especially those who began 
offending prior to 9/11 and where media coverage has been sparse. The information that was 
available did not, on the whole, provide any surprising insights. Canadian jihadis, both before 
and after 9/11 appear to have been primarily ideologically motivated by a combination of 
anger at foreign policy, a religious sense of social identity along with religiously-framed 
justifications for violence, an altruistic desire to help fellow Muslims in conflict zones, and a 
desire for revenge against the perceived enemies of Islam. This motivational melting pot 
appears to have remained relatively stable over time, albeit with shifts in the specific 
locations of concern and the targets of anger. In particular, Canada itself became a legitimate 
target after participating in the war in Afghanistan. But interestingly (in the Toronto 18 case) 
venom was also directed at Canada by way of “guilt by association” because of ties with the 
US and because of generalized perceptions that Canada was “discriminating against 
Muslims”.172  
These findings demonstrate that despite the apparent fact that Canadian Muslims on 
the whole appear to be satisfied with their country,173 there are of course a minority who are 
not. However, it is noteworthy that domestic grievances were secondary to global political 
issues and members of the Toronto group did not describe personal experiences of 
discrimination in Canada, suggesting that dissatisfaction with the domestic situation of the 
home country may well develop as a product of radicalization, rather than necessarily driving 
it. Consistent with this interpretation, there is evidence that the legitimacy of an attack in 
Canada needed additional justification, at least for some group members. In one recorded 
conversation, Stephen Chand stated that Islam did not permit an attack in Canada if a person 
had accepted the right to stay there, but a way around this was to leave and then re-enter 
without official authorization.174 Ahmad’s response to this was that the Canadian government 
spied on its own citizens, and this voided any implicit covenant.175 Thus, justification can 
follow on the desire to attack, rather than preceding it (in line with the idea that practical 
restraints may shape apparently ideologically-driven behaviour). 




 Briefly, there were also hints in some post-9/11 cases of additional motivations 
including anti-Semitism (An-Noor Hossain), financial motivations (Shareef Abdelhaleem), 
nationalism (Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed), and involuntary participation (Abdurahman 
Khadr). In line with the above discussion of ideological classification, although jihadi 
ideology may dominate as the primary source of explicit motivation, there is clearly room for 
individual idiosyncrasy.  
 
Analysis Part 3: Investigations and Legal Outcomes 
The final category of interest, as depicted in Table 3, relates to investigations and outcomes. 
Regarding investigations, information on how they were initiated was recorded, along with 
the primary source of evidence and the length of investigation from beginning through to 
arrest (excluding post-charge). As might be expected, missing information was frequent and 
judgements were sometimes difficult to make. Investigations sometimes seem to start out, 
only to be abandoned, and then re-initiated down the line. For the purposes of consistent 
analysis, if the individual(s) concerned were not continually a target of investigation, then the 
most recent ‘initiation-point’ was used. For example, in the case of Ressam, although he had 
previously come to the attention of Canadian investigators, he was ultimately not detected 
until the ‘chance’ intervention of US law enforcement (border security).176 
 
Table 3. Investigative and outcome variables in Canadian Islamist terrorism cases beginning 








Information on the initiation of investigations was available in 59% of cases/groups 
beginning prior to 9/11 (i.e. 19/32), and in 80% of cases since then (12/15). The available 
information indicates that among the earlier cases, 22% of investigations (7 cases) were 
initiated via international counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, such as the French investigation of 
the Kamel network, or Amer el-Maati and Amr Hamed, who were identified by documents 
found in Afghanistan.177 A further 19% of investigations (6 cases) began via domestic CT 
efforts, including monitoring communities and individuals (e.g. the Jabarah brothers178) and 
numerous arrests arising from the Ressam investigation (such as Abderraouf Hannachi179). 
The remainder of known cases were either initiated by way of overlapping law enforcement 
functions relating to border protection, or else were not applicable (Bilal Philips and 
Abdullahi Afrah were not seemingly investigated).  
From what is known about post-9/11 cases until the end of 2011, there is not a huge 
difference, although the range of sources appears to be somewhat more diverse. International 
and domestic CT efforts account for 33% and 20% of cases (5 vs. 3) respectively (bearing in 
mind that we are focusing on cases here and not individuals; 52% of the latter have been 
detected via domestic CT since 9/11). Other sources include jihadi publications (Mohamed 
Elmi Ibrahim180), domestic law enforcement (Stanikzy181), and one public tip-off (Mohamed 
Hassan Hersi182). There was no apparent investigation in the case of Mohamed Abdullahi 
Mohamed. 
Note that the relatively strong international component to counter-terrorism over time 
should not be surprising, given continued international links and an emphasis on international 
CT cooperation. It is also noteworthy that within CT there appears to have been some 
changes. Although human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in the 
form of wiretaps are both continued key sources of information, online electronic SIGINT 
has clearly become more important over the past decade. Indeed, when discussing the 
importance of the Internet in relation to Islamist terrorism, it is often forgotten that it is a 
double-edged sword for jihadists and presents opportunities on both sides of the law in equal 
measure.  
 In terms of the length of investigations, in accordance with findings that offence 
periods have shortened over time, so too have investigations (see Table 3). They are also 
naturally shorter than offending careers, because individuals are not immediately detected.  
 Primary sources of evidence were identified in 78% of pre-9/11 cases and 93% of 
post-9/11 cases (i.e. 25 vs. 14). Among known cases beginning before 9/11, top forms of 
evidence included confessions (25% or 8 cases; though note these are not confessions in a 




court of law); secret evidence as in security certificates (19%, or 6 cases), which, from what 
is known involved a combination of HUMINT and SIGINT; and combined evidence (19%) 
where no particular form of evidence (HUMINT/ SIGINT/ physical evidence/ surveillance/ 
other) could be treated as primary over and above the others. In more recent cases, the 
primary forms of evidence have been HUMINT (20%, 3 cases) e.g. as with Ferid Imam, 
identified by an American associate183; combined evidence (20%) e.g. Khawaja184; and 
SIGINT (13%, 2 cases) e.g. Faruq ’Isa.185 In addition, while no pre-9/11 cases were reported 
to have involved undercover agents or informants (covert human intelligence sources/ CHIS) 
they formed the core of the Toronto 18 case.  
Overall, these findings are congruent with results above showing a relative decrease 
in the number of confessions/admissions, a decline since 2003 in the use of extra-judicial 
sanctions, and an increase in the use of electronic SIGINT. Other than these legal and 
technological changes, which reflect improved CT capacities, there are no obvious systematic 
differences in investigations before and after 9/11. 
 
Legal Outcomes 
Only 46% of Canadian Islamist terrorists who began their career prior to 9/11 (16 
individuals) have been prosecuted; this figure is 48% (14 individuals) among post-9/11 
offenders, although a further 31% (9 individuals) have been charged, with outcomes pending. 
These figures are in accordance with the individual classifications (see above). 
 For those who were prosecuted, 88% of pre-9/11 starters (14 individuals) were 
convicted, with 12% guilty pleas; the average sentence was 8.8 years; 3 individuals received 
life sentences (in Libya, Algeria and the US); at the time the analysis was conducted, for 1 
individual (Ressam) sentencing was still pending after his original sentence was deemed 
inappropriate (since then he has been sentenced to 37 years186); 1 individual’s sentence 
(Abdelmajid Dahoumane) is unknown; 1 person (Mustapha Labsi) has been convicted twice, 
once in France and once in Algeria;187 and another, Adel Boumezbeur, was due to stand trial 
in Algeria after being convicted in France, although the outcome is unknown.188 For those 
prosecuted who began offending in the post-9/11 era, 50% (7 individuals) were convicted and 
50% pleaded guilty. At first glance this would seem to contradict the above contention that 
there has been a decrease in ‘confessions’ as evidence, however, the earlier admissions often 
occurred under interrogation or other circumstances, often in cases that did not go to trial, and 
more recent confessions were often in the face of overwhelming evidence. After 9/11 the 
average sentence has increased to 10.25 years, and 4 individuals have been given life 




sentences (all in Canada), though as in the UK they are still eligible for parole following 
minimum terms.  
 Taken together, it is clear that Canadian Islamist terrorists are far more likely to be 
prosecuted (and to be prosecuted in Canada); they are more likely to plead guilty; and they 
are more likely to receive a longer sentence. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
Since the 1980s there has been a steady rate of individuals becoming involved in Islamist 
terrorism in Canada. Over time, it has become more likely for these offenders to be 
prosecuted in Canada. There has also been a geographic shift in Canadian networks as 
Montreal has diminished in significance as compared to Toronto, with isolated cases 
cropping up in areas outside of major urban areas. 
 All confirmed Canadian jihadis have been males, although there have been signs more 
recently that females are getting involved as well. The average age remains in the 20s, 
although this has reduced from the late to mid-range, consistent with more proactive CT. 
Illegal entry into Canada has apparently ceased to become a factor and, over time, more 
Islamist militants have been born and/or raised there. Ethnic heritage has become less 
dominated by North Africans, and more diverse, seemingly related to geo-political changes 
worldwide.  
The picture regarding educational attainment is unclear, however it seems as if most 
individuals in the sample had at least basic high school education and a small minority 
continue to achieve university qualifications. However, in terms of occupation, there appears 
to have been a slight overall decline, possibly related to age. There is little information about 
prior religious practice, but generally this seems to increase as part of the radicalization 
process (albeit with a narrow focus). Marriage remains common. Most Canadian jihadis do 
not seem to have a previous criminal record (and therefore have not radicalized in prison) 
although there have been a few cases that demonstrate a willingness to commit crime in order 
help finance terrorist operations or acquire materiel. Canadian involvement in Islamist 
terrorism cannot be explained by mental illness. 
There is an overall disappointing lack of reliable information relating to individual 
processes of radicalization, although the Internet has clearly become more pervasive over 
time. There are few indications that individuals have radicalized entirely online, rather 
absorption of online propaganda tends to supplement and invigorate face-to-face interactions. 
Ideologically, the vast majority of individuals over time can be classed as ‘Jihadis’, with a 




minority who are ‘Hardcore’. There are also a handful of ideological outliers motivated by 
non-ideological and sometimes personal factors.   
Individuals in the sample were often part of relatively small groups, often with some 
form of external links. Leadership can best be described as collaborative, however it clearly 
varies by context and recent cases indicate a willingness to proceed with terrorist operations 
in the absence of any external support. Individual offending careers have become shorter in 
recent years, again consistent with more vigilant and effective CT. 
 A large proportion of individuals in the sample, before and after 9/11, have been 
involved in facilitating terrorism. Overseas training and combat have also remained popular, 
although some individuals have been willing to train at home rather than attempt international 
travel. More individuals over time have become involved in planning to conduct terrorist 
attacks, and there has been a clear trend indicating that domestic attacks in Canada are now 
deemed viable, even though numbers are low. Fundraising activities have become less visible 
and apparently smaller-scale. There have been more examples of overt promotion of jihadi 
ideology, notably online, but it is apparent that Canada has lacked a truly influential jihadi 
ideologue either before or after 9/11. Across different types of activity there has been a 
substantial decrease in the proportion of individuals who are focused only on overseas events 
and a corresponding decrease in international travel. This is indicative of a growing 
willingness to conduct domestic operations. 
There has been a reduction in international links and there has been change in the 
location of those links- becoming more diverse and less dominated by any single global 
hotspot. Unconfirmed information indicates that Somalia –and now Syria- have become more 
prominent than current, reliable data suggest. While the nature of overseas connections may 
have become more limited (with less support apparently being provided outside of conflict 
zones) foreign ‘sponsorship’ for attacks launched within or from Canada cannot be ruled out. 
Meanwhile on the domestic stage, Canadian Islamist terrorism networks have become more 
fragmented. 
The Internet has become more prominent over time in the lives of jihadis. Available 
information suggests that the most common uses in Canada are accessing propaganda, 
communication, disseminating material, and researching attacks. 
Motives have, on the whole, stayed quite stable over time, primarily revolving around 
intermingled themes of foreign policy, religion, altruism and revenge. Canada itself appears 
to be targeted mostly for its support of the war in Afghanistan, but there are signs that jihadis 




harbour generalized domestic grievances also. A minority of individuals are motivated by 
personal or idiosyncratic concerns. 
Relating to investigations, there continues to be a combination of domestic and 
international CT efforts, and the average length of investigation appears to have reduced, in 
accordance with shorter offence periods.189 There have been no clear changes in the type of 
evidence that is used, except for the growth in electronic SIGINT, reflecting advances in 
technology. Finally, in terms of outcomes, Canadian Islamist militants are more likely to be 
prosecuted, more likely to be prosecuted in Canada, and to receive longer sentences.  
When viewed as a whole, the background variables, operational behaviours and 
investigations and outcomes clearly demonstrate the ‘home-grown’ nature of Canadian 
Islamist terrorism. In all three areas, the Canadian homeland has taken on greater significance 
and changes that have occurred are generally in accordance with existing analyses of home-
grown Islamist terrorism in the West190 (thus lending a degree of support to these 
conclusions). In particular, the increase in individuals born and/or raised in Canada, the 
growing domestic focus of operations, and the apparently more limited nature of overseas 
support for those based in Canada, are significant in this regard. The domestic situation is still 
shaped by the global context and international links have far from disappeared, but foreign 
support outside of conflict zones, on the whole, is less substantial than in the past. This is 
consistent with a reduced threat in terms of likely capacity to perpetrate large-scale, 
sophisticated attacks, whilst at the same time there has evidently been an increase in 
Canadian counter-terrorism capabilities.191 This must of course be viewed in the context of an 
increased likelihood of domestic attack, regardless of magnitude, and an ever more diverse 
threat (reflected, for example, in ethnic backgrounds and geographic location of cases). 
Moreover, given the documented similarities to other Western nations thus far, Canada must 
be prepared for further challenging developments that have been observed elsewhere, 
especially so-called ‘lone-wolf’ terrorists and ‘active shooter’ scenarios, which may be 
especially difficult to detect in advance. 
 Having pointed out a number of similarities between the Canadian experience of 
jihadi terrorism and that of similar countries, it is also important to address differences. Of 
primary significance here are rates of terrorism Although complete, directly comparable 
datasets are yet to emerge, available information suggests that the rate of Islamist terrorism 
cases in Canada is not only low in absolute terms, but is also among the lowest in the West, 
relative to its Muslim population size.192 In the past, scholars have explained this as part of a 
more general difference between North America and Europe whereby the former has been 




viewed as partially inoculated against ‘home-grown’ Islamist terrorism due to the more 
successful integration of Muslim immigrants.193 The above discussion of motivations 
established that domestic grievances may still play a role, and Canada has not been without 
its controversies relating to the ‘War on Terror’. The use of security certificates, Canadians 
tortured abroad and the case of Omar Khadr in particular have caused outcry. Yet Muslims 
report relatively high levels of satisfaction with life in Canada194 and this may well have 
militated against broadly experienced frustrations that might find expression in acts of 
terrorism. The ‘immigration-integration hypothesis’ thus contributes to understanding of pre-
disposing risk, but it does not by itself offer a compelling, comprehensive explanation of 
differential rates of terrorism. Rather, it seems that a number of factors have combined to 
afford Canada a degree of ‘protection’.195 
In addition to a seemingly successful approach to Muslim immigration, Canada has 
been fortunate not to play host to more significant jihadi ideologues. Ostensibly non-violent 
anti-democratic Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir have also been lacking196 (and recent 
activity appears to have been minimal). Moreover, Canada was fortunate to have had an early 
‘wake-up call’ with the arrest of Ressam since this led to dismantling of a significant 
proportion of existing networks. Canada also, perhaps wisely, stayed out of the Iraq war, 
avoiding what became the ‘icing on the cake’ for justifying domestic attacks as far as 
militants elsewhere in the West have been concerned.197 Given that anger at Western foreign 
policy has been a key driver of Islamist militancy, and that the necessary conditions for 
involvement in the ‘Global Salafi jihad’ are a combination of ideological and social 
exposure,198 it is evident that these critical, direct motivators have also been comparatively 
lacking in Canada. 
Of course it should not be assumed that the situation cannot change. This study has 
clearly established that Canada has become a target regardless of ‘protective’ factors and it 
can be reasonably assumed that this trend will continue. Furthermore, with rapid growth 
expected in the Muslim population,199 combined with erratic global developments the 
situation in the future is difficult to predict.  
The Canadian security apparatus has successfully contained the threat so far and 
RCMP, CSIS and other policing agencies have also undertaken encouraging community 
engagement exercises (some directly related to CT, others much less so).200 The Canadian 
government furthermore recently unfurled its national counter-terrorism strategy, including 
plans to expand ‘soft’ CT measures.201 The Canadian strategy follows a similar format to 
those of the UK and Australia, identifying four main strands for countering terrorism 




revolving around proactive investigation (‘Detect’), target hardening (‘Deny’), contingency 
planning (‘Respond’) and building community resilience against extremist ideologies 
(‘Prevent’).202 The latter element entails countering violent extremism (CVE) by way of 
community partnerships and represents the most novel development, although similar 
measures are in place already in the UK and Australia, and the US unveiled a strategic 
implementation plan  for CVE last year. 203 This marks a significant development in Canada. 
Members of the Somali community in Ottawa have held at least one conference aimed at 
discussing ways to combat radicalization of Somali youth,204 and there are a handful of 
figures in the community in the Toronto area who previously developed their own approaches 
to countering radicalization.205 But such ‘grassroots’ efforts have not so far received support 
from the Canadian government and until the release of the new CT strategy paper there were 
few signs that Ottawa was considering investing in counter-radicalization (either in 
communities or within prisons for convicted terrorists206) as part of a more comprehensive 
CT strategy.  
In light of the continuation of the threat, the potential for localised militant ‘hotspots’ 
to persist over time and the clearly more developed domestic component as suggested in the 
current report, plans for CVE within Canada appear well-founded. But while there are 
grounds for cautious optimism, it is worth noting that CVE in the UK has been fraught with 
difficulties centred around choosing appropriate community partners and implementing 
programs in such a way as to avoid inadvertently stigmatizing the very communities which 
are meant to be engaged and strengthened.207 The road ahead for Canada thus remains 
potentially rocky and will depend upon a number of factors including consistent, clear 
guidelines for community engagement, identifiable goals, and an ongoing commitment to 
evaluation of interventions.208  
It is beyond the scope of the current paper to delve further into Canadian CT; 
however, a first step for effectively countering any threat is to understand it. This research 
serves as a starting point on which further studies can build and add to what we know about 
Islamist terrorism in the Canadian context. 
  




Appendix A: Included Cases 
Cases included in the analysis are listed in chronological order according to when they began. 
Case numbers are followed by individual names, brief case description, known offence 
period, and classification (basis for inclusion). 
 
Pre-9/11 
1. Ahmed Said Khadr. Al-Qaeda (AQ) facilitator killed in Pakistan. Active 1986-2003. 
Killed in Action (KIA)/ Extra-judicial sanctions (international). 
2. Mustafa Mohamed Krer. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group fundraiser. Active 1987-1998. 
Overseas conviction (Libya)/ Confession. 
3. Essam Hafez Marzouk. AQ operative imprisoned in Egypt. Active 1988-1998. Overseas 
conviction (Egypt). 
4. Fateh Kamel. Montreal jihadi network. Active 1990-2001. Overseas conviction (France). 
5. Ahmad Abou el-Maati. Trained in Afghanistan. Active 1991-1998. Confession. 
6. Amer el-Maati. Trained in Afghanistan, suspected AQ operative. Active 1990-2001… 
Public allegations. 
7. Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub. Alleged senior member of Vanguards of Conquest. Active 
1992-2000. Overseas conviction (Egypt)/ Extra-judicial sanctions. 
8. Kassem Daher. Alleged jihadi support network. Active 1995-1998. Legal allegations 
(US). 
9. Mourad Ikhlef. Montreal jihadi network. Active 1993-2001. Overseas conviction 
(Algeria). 
10. Adil Charkaoui. Alleged AQ sleeper agent. Active 1993-2003. Extra-judicial sanctions. 
11. Bilal Philips. Sending military trainers to Bosnia. Active 1992… Confession. 
12. Karim Said Atmani. Montreal jihadi network. Active 1994-1998. Overseas conviction 
(France). 
13. Abdullah Ahmed Khadr. Arms dealer for AQ. Active 1994-2004. Confession/ Legal 
allegations (US). 
14. Abdurahman Khadr. Trained at AQ camps in Afghanistan. Active 1994-2001. 
Confession. 
15. Mohamed Harkat. Alleged AQ sleeper agent. Active 1994-2001. Extra-judicial 
sanctions. 
16. Abdellah Ouzghar. Montreal jihadi network; Convicted for criminal activity in support 
of terrorism. Active …1996. Overseas conviction (France). 




17. Abderraouf Hannachi. Montreal jihadi network; Implicated by Ressam. Active 1996-
1999. Overseas conviction (Tunisia). 
18. Mahmoud es-Sayyid Jaballah. Suspected member of al-Jihad. Active 1996-2001. Extra-
judicial sanctions/ Overseas conviction (Egypt). 
19. Mustapha Labsi. Montreal jihadi network; Assisted Abu Doha in UK. Active 1996-
2001. Overseas convictions (France/ Algeria). 
20. Adel Boumezbeur. Montreal jihadi network; Convicted for criminal activity in support 
of terrorism. Active …2001. Overseas conviction (France). 
21. Abdullahi Afrah. Union of Islamic Courts leader. Active 1997-2008. KIA (Somalia). 
22. Amr Hamed. Trained in Afghanistan. Active …1998. KIA (Afghanistan). 
23. Ahmed Ressam, Abdelmajid Dahoumane, Mokhtar Haouari, Samir Ait Mohamed. 
Montreal jihadi network; Millennium bomb plot. Active 1998-1999. 3x Overseas 
convictions (US/ Algeria), 1x Legal allegations (US)/ Extra-judicial sanctions. 
24. Abderraouf Jdey. Suspected AQ operative. Active 1999… Public allegations. 
25. Faker Ben Abdelazziz Boussora. Suspected AQ operative. Active 1999… Public 
allegations. 
26. Abu Sufian al-Salamabi Muhammed Ahmed 'Abd al-Razziq. Designated AQ 
financier. Active 1999… Extra-judicial sanctions (US). 
27. Djamel Saiid Ali Ameziane. Captured in Afghanistan, detained in Guantanamo. Active 
2000-2001. Extra-judicial sanctions (US). 
28. Abdulrahman Mansour Jabarah. AQ operative. Active 2000-2003. KIA (Saudi 
Arabia). 
29. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah. AQ operative. Active 2000-2002. Overseas conviction 
(US). 
30. Mohammed Abdullah Warsame. Fought in Afghanistan, continued support. Active 
2000-2003. Overseas conviction (US). 
31. Hassan Zemiri. Montreal jihadi network; trained in Afghanistan. Active …2001. Extra-
judicial sanctions (US). 
32. Abdel Rahman Fakhri Abou el-Ila. Planning attacks in Egypt. Active 2001-2001. 
Overseas conviction (Egypt). 
 
Post-9/11 
33. Hassan Farhat. Allegedly joined Ansar al-Islam in Iraq. Active 2001… Public 
allegations. 




34. Omar Khadr. Afghanistan combatant. Active …2002. Overseas conviction (US). 
35. Mohammad Momin Khawaja. Provided logistic support to UK jihadis. Active 2002-
2004. Prosecuted. 
36. Saeed Sobrahatollah Muhammad Rasoul and Masoud Rasoul. Allegedly joined Ansar 
al-Islam in Iraq. Active 2002… Public allegations. 
37. Rudwan Khalil Abubaker. Fought in Chechnya. Active …2003. KIA (Chechnya). 
38. Fahim Ahmad, Zakariya Amara, Shareef Abdelhaleem, Saad Khalid, Saad Gaya, 
Amin Mohamed Durrani, Jahmaal James, Steven Vikash Chand, Mohammed Ali 
Dirie, Asad Ansari and Nishanthan Yogakrishnan. ‘Toronto 18’. Active 2005-2006. 
Prosecuted. 
39. Said Namouh. AQ propagandist. Active 2006-2007. Prosecuted. 
40. Ferid Ahmed Imam and Maiwand Yar. AQ trainers. Active 2006… Legal allegations 
(Canada/ US). 
41. Salman An-Noor Hossain. Ran extremist website. Active 2007… Legal allegations 
(non-terror). 
42. Hiva Mohammad Alizadeh, Misbahuddin Ahmed and Khurram Syed Sher. Alleged 
plot to bomb Parliament Hill. Active 2008-2010. Legal allegations. 
43. Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed. Fought for al-Shabaab. Active 2008-2009. Confession. 
44. Faruq Khalil Muhammad ’Isa aka Sayfildin Tahrir Sharif. Alleged facilitator for 
Iraqi militant network. Active 2008-2011. Legal allegations (US). 
45. Mohammed Elmi Ibrahim. Fought for al-Shabaab. Active 2009-2010. KIA (Somalia). 
46. Matin Abdul Stanikzy. Alleged plot to bomb Canadian military base. Active …2010. 
Legal allegations. 




Appendix B. Excluded cases 
Notable excluded cases are listed in chronological order according to alleged activities or 
dates of allegations, followed by reason for exclusion. 
 
1. Ahmed al-Kaysee. Alleged Afghan war veteran. 1980s/90s. Insufficient information. 
2. Hassan Almrei. Trained in Afghanistan. 1990-1996. Prior to coming to Canada. 




3. Mohamedouh Ould Slahi. Suspected AQ recruiter. 1990-2000. Visitor (non-Canadian 
resident). 
4. Abdullah Almalki. Suspected terrorist, tortured in Syria. 1992-2002. Released without 
charge. 
5. Mohamed Omary, Abdel Boumezbeur, Nabil Ikhlef, Said Gasmi, Nacer Hamaidi, 
Said Arar, Hamid Aich, Abdel Hakim Tizegha and Laifa Khabou. Montreal jihadi 
network associates. 1990s. Insufficient information/ Non-residents. 
6. Muayyed Nureddin. Suspected terrorist, tortured in Syria. 1996-2003. Released without 
charge. 
7. Fahad al-Shehri. Suspected terrorist, deported to Saudi Arabia. 1996-1997. 
Unconfirmed. 
8. Kaleem Akhtar. Linked to Wadih el-Hage. 1997. Unconfirmed. 
9. Idriss. Alleged AQ operative. 1998. Insufficient information. 
10. Huseyincan Celil aka Guler Dilaver. Convicted Uighur terrorist. 2000. Prior to coming 
to Canada/ Non-Global-Salafi Jihad (GSJ). 
11. Nageeb Abdul Jabbar Mohammed al-Hadi. Questioned re. 9/11. Unconfirmed. 
12. Benmar Benatta. Suspected terrorist held in US for 5 years. 2001. Released without 
charge. 
13. Moussa Mohamed Khalifa. Alleged member of GSPC. 2001. Visitor/ Unconfirmed. 
14. Ahmad Shehab. Uncle of suspected terrorist Nabil al-Marabh. 2001. Never charged. 
15. Liban Hussein. Assets frozen for financing terrorism. 2001. Quashed on lack of 
evidence. 
16. Maher Arar. Suspected terrorist, tortured in Syria. 2002. Released without charge. 
17. Nizar bin Muhammad Naser Nawar. Tunisian suicide bomber. 2002. Unconfirmed 
significance of time in Canada. 
18. Arwad al-Boushi. Detained in Syria relating to Muslim Brotherhood involvement. 2002. 
Unconfirmed. 
19. Amine Mezbar. Accused of plotting to bomb US embassy in Paris. 2002. Acquitted. 
20. Zahoor Hussain, Muhammad Waheed, Fahim Kayani, Imran Khan, Sajjad Ahmad, 
Manzoor Qadar Joyia, Yousaf Rasheed, Muhammad Asif Aziz, Kishif Siddique, 
Moahmmed Asif, Mohammad Akhtar, Muhammad Waliu Siddiqui, Muhammad 
Naeem, Saif Ullah Khan, Aqeel Ahmed, Jahan Zain Sawhney, Muddasar Awan, 
Muhammad Nouman, Anwar ur-Rehman, Shehzad Khurram Toor, Unnamed 1, 
Unnamed 2, Unnamed 3. Project Thread. 2003. No terrorism charges pursued. 




21. Kamal Elbahja and Azar Tagiev. Disappeared after going to Chechnya with Rudwan 
Abubaker. 2003. Unconfirmed. 
22. Abu Abdul Rahman al-Iraqi. Alleged leader n Iraqi insurgency. 2003-2006… 
Unconfirmed. 
23. Kassim Mohamed. Filmed CN Tower, questioned in Egypt. 2004. Released without 
charge. 
24. Aumar Alsorani. Detained in Iraq. 2004. Unconfirmed. 
25. Qayyum Abdul Jamal, Yasin Abdi Mohamed, Ahmad Mustafa Ghany, Ibrahim 
Alkhalel Aboud, Sahl Syed, Unnamed minor 1, Unnamed minor 2, Unnamed minor 
3. Toronto 18 network. 2005-2006. Charges stayed/ Unconfirmed. 
26. Zaynab Khadr. Investigated for suspected terrorism offences. 2005. Never charged. 
27. Assem Hammoud. Involved in plot to attack tunnels in New York. 2006. Unconfirmed 
significance of time in Canada. 
28. Tahawwur Hussein Rana. Assisted David Headley in Danish attack plot. 2008-2009. 
Included in US sample (never offended in Canada). 
29. Muhannad al-Farekh. Associate of Ferid Imam and Maiwand Yar. 2006. Not charged.  
30. Sohail Qureshi. Arrested in Afghanistan. 2007. Released without charge. 
31. Abdifatah Mohamed Ibrahim. Accused of terrorism offences in Somalia. Unconfirmed 
identity. 
32. Khalid Aden Noor, Mustafa Ali, Ahmed Heybe Ahmed, Abdirahman Yusuf, 
Mustafa Mohamed, Mohamed Abscir and Mohamed Ali Gacal. ‘Somali 6’- possible 
associates of Mohamed Elmi Ibrahim. 2009. Unconfirmed. Note- Mahad Ali Dhore was 
also originally excluded from the sample, however it has since been reported that he was 
killed whilst taking part in an al-Shabaab terrorist attack in Mogadishu in April 2013.  
33. Abu Shahid, Jeam Paull, Leman Langlois, James Richard, Otto Paul, Thomas, Paul 
Gall, Unnamed 1, Unnamed 2, Unnamed 3, Unnamed 4 and Unnamed 5. Allegedly 
trained in Afghanistan. 2010. Unconfirmed. 
34. Muhan Jeans aka Abdirahman the Canadian. Killed in Somalia. 2011. Unconfirmed 
identity. 
35. Asli Nur and Unnamed Female. Allegedly joined al-Shabaab. 2011. Unconfirmed. 
36. Unnamed Male 1 and Unnamed Male 2. Allegedly joined al-Shabaab. 2011. 
Unconfirmed. 
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